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State v. Buggs:
Is It Really So Black and White?
Joseph Murphy*
Introduction
In State v. Buggs,l the appellant, a Black male, sought
reversal of his first-degree murder conviction, arguing that the
removal of a prospective juror in his trial was racially motivated.
The prosecutor had used a peremptory challenge2 to remove a
potential White juror who expressed concerns about the lack of
minorities on the jury panel and about how minorities are often
treated unfairly by the criminal justice system and society.3 The
trial court ruled that it was an appropriate peremptory challenge,
a decision affirmed on appeal by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
4
Although Buggs raised several issues on appeal,5 this Comment
focuses exclusively on Buggs's argument that excluding the
potential juror solely on the basis of her expressed racial beliefs
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
* J.D. expected 2000, University of Minnesota; B.A. 1996, University of Notre
Dame. I would like to thank the editors and staff members of the Journal of Law
and Inequality for all of their hard work. I would also like to thank Steven Russett
for helping me select the topic.
1. 581 N.W.2d 329 (Minn. 1998).
2. The peremptory challenge allows either party in a civil or criminal case to
remove a potential juror without an explanation of the removal. See generally
Coburn R. Beck, The Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 961, 963-70 (1998) (describing the history of the peremptory challenge).
3. See infra note 99 and accompanying text (showing the excluded juror's
responses to the prosecutor's questions).
4. See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 339.
5. See id. at 332. In addition to the argument concerning the peremptory
challenge of a juror, Buggs advanced four other arguments that were all rejected by
the court. See id. First, Buggs argued that the trial court erred in admitting the
victim's hearsay statements as dying declarations where the record does not
indicate the victim's belief in her impending death. See id. Second, Buggs argued
that evidence of a prior assault by Buggs against the victim was erroneously
admitted. See id. Third, Buggs argued that the instructions given to the jury did
not provide them with sufficient guidance on how to resolve a deadlock. See id.
Finally, Buggs argued that the trial suffered from several instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. See id.
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Constitution 6 by denying Buggs a representative jury of fair-
minded peers and by denying the juror an opportunity to
participate in the judicial process. 7
This Comment argues that the Buggs court erred in refusing
to apply the protections of the Equal Protection Clause to Buggs
and the excluded juror in his trial. Part I analyzes the history of
the peremptory challenge and how its racially discriminatory use
was limited by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v.
Kentucky8 and its progeny. 9 Part II outlines the facts and the
holding of Buggs.10 Part III examines Batson's three justifications
for prohibiting race-based peremptory strikes, and argues that
courts should consider racial opinion, not simply racial status,
when determining whether a juror exclusion is constitutional."
This Comment addresses the potential dangers of adhering to the
precedent set by Buggs, and argues that extending Batson
protection to the racial beliefs of jurors would not eliminate the
usefulness of the peremptory challenge. Ultimately, this
Comment concludes that Buggs takes a step in the wrong direction
by encouraging rather than discouraging racial intolerance and
discrimination.
I. Background
The Buggs decision raises important questions concerning
the continued use of the peremptory challenge as a tool which
results in racial discrimination. The opinion effectively
undermines the three purposes for eliminating racially motivated
peremptory challenges outlined in Batson by the United States
Supreme Court. 12 In Batson, the Court recognized that eliminating
racial discrimination from jury selection served three goals: (1)
ensuring that defendants are not discriminated against because of
6. "No state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. This clause requires that
similarly situated persons receive similar treatment under the law. See generally
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8 (5th ed. 1996). This right
to equal protection under the law is a fundamental right. See id. Therefore, any
law which significantly burdens the equal protection rights of a person or class of
persons is subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling or overriding interest of the government. See id.
7. See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 339.
8. 476 U.S. 79, 85-88 (1985)(eliminating peremptory challenges based on the
race of the juror
9. See infra notes 12-84 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 85-126 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 127-162 and accompanying text.
12. 476 U.S. at 85-88. See also Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 329.
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their race or on the false assumption that members of defendant's
race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors; 13 (2) ensuring
that jurors are not discriminated against because of their race; 14
and (3) fostering public confidence in the fairness of our justice
system.15 In light of the Batson holding, Buggs is problematic,
because the Minnesota Supreme Court construed race as an issue
which only concerns racial minorities.
A. History of the Peremptory Challenge
The peremptory challenge of the American legal system
derived from English common law16 and has been codified in
federal and state law. 17 The peremptory challenge, also known as
a peremptory strike, has traditionally allowed a party to remove a
member of the venire is without giving any explanation to justify
the removal. 19 In addition, either party may exercise a "for cause"
challenge to remove a potential juror, but, in contrast to a
peremptory challenge, a "for cause" challenge requires that the
party give a "narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable
13. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
14. See id. at 87.
15. See id.
16. See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1965) (explaining
the use of the peremptory challenge in common law England). At common law, the
defendant was allowed 35 peremptory challenges in all felony trials. See id. Then,
the prosecutor was allowed an unlimited number of challenges before examination
and could have any juror "stand aside" after examination. See id. If this resulted
in a deficient number of jurors, the prosecutor would have .to show cause with
respect to the jurors recalled to make up the required number. See id.
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1994) (in federal court, a party in a civil case
ordinarily has three peremptory challenges); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (explaining
that in a criminal case, the number of peremptory challenges varies depending on
the potential punishment); Swain, 380 U.S. at 217 & n.20 (noting that most states
have similar statutory grants of peremptory challenges).
18. See JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 44 (1992). The "venire" is the
panel of prospective jurors. See id. Before every trial, the final jury is selected
from a venire provided by the court. See id. The method of selecting people for the
venire varies in each jurisdiction, but often citizens called to be on the venire are
chosen from voter registration lists. See id. Once the venire is selected, a process
called "voir dire," which translated means "to speak the truth," is used to screen
biased jurors. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JERALD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
969 (2d ed. 1992). During voir dire, jurors are asked questions and either the court
or the parties may strike a prospective juror for cause. See VALERIE P. HANS &
NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 67 (1986). Unlike peremptory challenges, a party
may exercise an unlimited number of "for cause" challenges. See Beck, supra note
2, at 964. The court then determines the sufficiency and validity of the "for cause"
challenge. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra, at 973. Finally, the parties may exercise
their allotted peremptory challenges in order to finalize the make-up of the jury.
See HANS & VIDMAR, supra, at 67.
19. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 18, at 67.
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basis of partiality" to justify the removal.20 A party may find a
prospective juror unfit to serve on the jury of a particular case due
to the juror's bias, prior experiences, relationship to the case or the
involved parties, or some similar factor that interferes with the
juror's ability to adjudicate the matter fairly and impartially. 21
The peremptory challenge works in combination with the "for
cause" challenge to protect litigants from juror bias. Since the "for
cause" challenge should, theoretically, eliminate all verifiably
biased jurors from the venire, parties only use peremptory
challenges on jurors who the court has found qualified to serve
fairly and impartially. Thus, as the peremptory challenge is
arguably unnecessary to conduct a fair trial, there is considerable
debate in the legal community regarding its usefulness.22 Some
commentators call for a return to the unlimited peremptory
challenge, 23 while others argue that the practice should be
eliminated altogether.2 4 Despite its long history, the peremptory
challenge is not constitutionally protected, 25 so the debate over its
utility will likely continue.
Prior to Batson, courts were reluctant to inquire into a
party's motive for using a peremptory challenge on a juror.26
Theoretically, racially motivated jury selection was prohibited in
Strauder v. West Virginia,27 decided in 1879. The Strauder court
addressed the validity of a West Virginia statute that excluded
20. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
21. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, at 973 (reviewing the development of
the "for cause" challenge).
22. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (demonstrating in seven
separate and wide-ranging opinions that significant disagreements exist between
Supreme Court Justices regarding the legitimacy of the peremptory challenge).
23. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 2, at 997-1000 (arguing that the peremptory
challenge is a useful safeguard when a "for cause" challenge fails, that giving
parties a sense of control over their jury will foster confidence in the jury system
and that it is not a truly discriminatory device because all jurors are equally
subject to its use).
24. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-08 (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing for
the abolishment of the peremptory challenge). See also Raymond J. Broderick,
Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L REV. 369, 422
(1992) (arguing that the peremptory challenge is a "flaw in our judicial fabric"
which should be totally abolished).
25. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (noting that peremptory
challenges "are not constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather they are
but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a
fair trial").
26. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1965) (finding that all
potential jurors are equally subject to peremptory strikes, and making every strike
open to examination would radically change the nature and operation of the
peremptory challenge).
27. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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Black males from jury service and held that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 28 Numerous
techniques, such as poll taxes, grandfather clauses and voter
registration literacy tests, were developed to avoid application of
this decision, and racial discrimination in jury selection continued
unchallenged until 1965.29
That year, in Swain v. Alabama,30 the Court recognized for
the first time that racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges could violate the Equal Protection Clause.31 Swain,
however, placed the burden on the defendant to prove that the
prosecutor systematically excluded Blacks "in case after case,
whatever the circumstances."3 2 Despite the defendant's proof that
no Black person had served on a jury in Talladega, Alabama for
fourteen years, the Swain Court found that this fact was
insufficient to conclusively establish that the defendant's equal
protection rights had been violated. 33 Since few states kept
records of the peremptory challenges used by prosecutors, the
Swain burden of proof was. nearly impossible to meet.34
B. Batson v. Kentucky
The landmark case Batson v. Kentucky reconsidered Swain's
holding that the burden of proof rested entirely on the defendant.35
In Batson, a Black criminal defendant claimed that the prosecutor
violated the defendant's Sixth36 and Fourteenth 37 Amendment
28. See id. at 310. The Court addressed "whether, by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, every citizen of the United States has a right to a trial ... by
a jury selected and impaneled without discrimination... because of race or color."
Id. at 305. While holding that racial discrimination in jury selection violates the
Equal Protection Clause, the Strauder court cautioned that its holding did not go so
far as to grant a defendant the right to a "petit jury composed in whole or in part of
persons of his own race." Id.
29. See Jose Felipe Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical
Tragedies in the Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L REv. 343, 353
n.33 (1998) (noting that voter registration requirements were often employed to
prevent blacks from voting, thus limiting the number of registered Blacks available
to be selected for jury service). See also Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-21 (demonstrating
that the Supreme Court essentially permitted unchecked discrimination through
the use of peremptory challenges).
30. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
31. See id.
32. Id. at 223.
33. See id. at 226.
34. See George B. Smith, Swain v. Alabama: The Use of Peremptory Challenges
to Strike Blacks front Juries, 27 HOW. L.J. 1571, 1576-77 (1984) (describing Swain
as establishing a "virtually impossible standard of proof').
35. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing a criminal defendant the right
20001
Law and Inequality
rights by using peremptory challenges to exclude all four Black
members of the venire. 38 The trial court denied the defendant's
motion to discharge the jury and the Kentucky Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's decision on appeal. 39 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Kentucky Supreme
Court, establishing a new precedent.40 It held, for the first time,
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against individual
jurors.4 1
Batson created a three-part test for detecting race-based
peremptory challenges 42 that courts continue to use today. 43 First,
the defendant must establish that the circumstances of the
peremptory challenge create a prima facie case that the prosecutor
removed the potential juror on the basis of race. 44 Second, if the
defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the State to come forward with a racially neutral
explanation for removing the juror from the venire. 45 Third, the
court must determine whether the defendant has successfully
to a trial by an impartial jury). The Court declined to address the defendant's
Sixth Amendment argument in its decision. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n.3.
37. See supra note 6 (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
guarantee).
38. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
39. See id. at 83-84.
40. See id. at 89-96.
41. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (stating that "the component of the jury selection
process at issue here, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors through
peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection
Clause").
42. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Huey, 76 F.3d 638, 640-41 (5th Cir. 1996)
(applying the Batson three-part test); State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 339 (Minn.
1998) (same).
44. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. To establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, the Batson court required a defendant to show that: (1) he is a
member of a "cognizable racial group"; (2) the prosecutor has used peremptory
strikes to remove members of defendant's race from the venire; and (3) any
relevant circumstances that raise an inference that the prosecutor used the
challenge to exclude the juror on account of race. Se id. For a discussion of how a
person's membership in a racial group is determined for the purpose of legal
classification see DAVID A- HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIc AMERICA (1995); NAOMI ZACK,
RACE AND MIXED RACE (1993); Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the Stat- The
Dilemmas of Classification, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 7 (1997); Nancy A. Denton, Racial
Identity and Census Categories Can Incorrect Categories Yield Correct
Information?, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 83 (1997).
45. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. A prosecutor's rebuttal may not rely merely on
the assumption that the juror would be partial to the defendant because of their




Batson expressly upheld the principle articulated in Strauder
that a defendant has no right to a "petit jury composed in whole or
in part of persons of his own race."47 Instead, the Batson holding
rested on a defendant's right to be "tried by a jury whose members
are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria."48 The Court
stated that "[tihe Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from
the jury on account of race, or on the false assumption that
members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as
jurors."49  Batson also held that a racially discriminatory
peremptory challenge violates the equal protection rights of the
excluded juror, because that person is denied participation in jury
service on account of race. 50 Finally, Batson sought to eliminate
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges because such
procedures were likely to undermine public confidence in the
fairness of the justice system.51
C. Post Batson Decisions
1. Extensions of the Equal Protection Clause to Peremptory
Challenges
In the decade following Batson, the Supreme Court extended
the reach of the Equal Protection Clause well beyond Batson's
particular facts. For example, the Court applied the prohibition
against race-based peremptory challenges to defense counsel in
46. See id.; see also infra, note 64 (outlining the method that a trial court
should utilize in making this determination).
47. Id. at 85 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879)). The
Batson court noted that the number of races and nationalities in the United States
makes such a guarantee unrealistic. See id at 85, n.6. Similarly, the Court has
never required that a jury mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive
groups in the population. See id.
48. Id. at 86 (citing Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906) and Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)).
49. Id. at 86 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Court noted that
"[plurposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire" denies a defendant the
very protection that "a trial by jury is intended to secure." Id. A jury is a body
"composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or
summoned to determine." Id. (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308). "Competence to
serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications
and ability impartially to consider evidence presented at a trial." Id. at 87.
50. See id. at 87. The Court stressed that a person's race simply "is unrelated





criminal cases and to both parties in civil cases.52  Batson
protections were also expanded beyond the racial context to
prevent gender discrimination in the selection of a jury.53
A number of lower courts have also extended Batson
protection to White venire members who are challenged on the
basis of their race. 54 For example, in Williams v. State,55 the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that Whites are a racial
group to which the principles of Batson apply.56 The Williams
court noted that although the exclusion of minorities or
traditionally disadvantaged members is more common, the
exclusion of racial groups normally in the majority is no less
objectionable. 57  Similarly, in State v. Gray,5s the Missouri
Supreme Court ruled that Batson prohibits racially motivated
peremptory challenges, regardless of the race of the defendant or
the excluded juror. 59 The Gray holding relied upon the principle
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,60 that the Equal Protection
Clause protects not only members of minority groups but also
persons who are members of a racial majority in the community. 61
In Powers v. Ohio,62 the United States Supreme Court
recognized the equal protection rights of the excluded juror despite
the absence of any apparent violation of the defendant's equal
protection rights.63  Powers involved race-based peremptory
52. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1992) (prohibiting a criminal
defendant from using peremptory challenges to remove jurors on the basis of race);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (prohibiting the
parties in a civil case from using peremptory challenges to remove jurors on the
basis of race).
53. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (prohibiting the use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors on the
basis of gender).
54. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59 (3d Cir.
1989); State v. Knox, 609 So. 803 (La. 1992); Gilchrist v. State, 667 A.2d 876 (Md.
1995); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1994).
55. 634 So.2d 1034 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. 887 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1994).
59. See id. at 369.
60. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (using the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate
separate university admissions procedures based upon the race of the applicant).
61. See Gray, 887 S.W.2d at 384-85.
62. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
63. See id. at 406 (noting that Batson was "designed to meet multiple ends,"
including the prevention of harm to the excluded juror). See also Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (recognizing the importance and benefits of allowing
ordinary citizens to participate in the administration ofjustice).
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challenges of Black venirepersons in the trial of a White
defendant. The Court held that "an individual juror does not have
a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does
possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race."64
This decision hinged on the principle that the White defendant
had third-party standing to assert the equal protection claims of
the excluded Black jurors. 65  The Court reasoned that the
"discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution
causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury," and that during
voir dire, a party can "establish a relation, if not a bond of trust,
with the jurors."66
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. McRae,67 applied
the Batson principle in the trial of a Black defendant to prohibit
the exclusion of a Black juror who expressed her concern about the
justice system's treatment of Black people. 68 After the trial court
determined that a prima facie case of racial discrimination was
established, the prosecutor justified the challenge by expressing
his fear that the juror's concerns about race and the justice system
would make her unable to serve impartially.69 The Minnesota
Supreme Court disallowed this strike and remanded the case,
stating:
[T]he juror in question appears to have simply answered the
prosecutor's questions.. .in the same way that a large
percentage of fair-minded, reasonable black people and fair-
minded, reasonable people of any other race would have
answered the questions. To allow the striking of this juror on
the basis of those answers in effect would allow a prosecutor to
strike any fair-minded, reasonable black person from the jury
panel who expressed any doubt [that] "the system" is perfect.70
64. Powers, 499 U.S. at 409.
65. See id. at 404, 415 (finding that third-party standing requires that the
vicarious party show an "injury in fact," a close relation to the third party and some
hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests).
66. Id. at 411, 413.
67. 494 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1992).
68. See id. at 253-58.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 257. McRae also outlined a trial court's two-part role in examining
the sufficiency of a racially neutral explanation of a peremptory challenge. See id.
(citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)). First, the trial court must
determine whether the prosecutor has articulated a facially race-neutral
explanation for the challenge. See id. Second, the court must evaluate the validity
of that explanation by determining "whether the race-neutral reason is the actual
basis for the peremptory strike or whether it was offered to mask a discriminatory
intent or purpose." Id. "Even if the explanation given by the prosecutor had been
acceptable on its face, the trial courts role, in reviewing the prosecutor's
explanation for the challenge, is to do more than determine whether the prosecutor
2000]
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2. Refusals to Extend Equal Protection to Peremptory
Challenges
Outside of the racial context, the Batson doctrine has rarely
been successful in overturning the use of a peremptory challenge. 71
For instance, in Purkett v. Elem,7 2 the Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor's non-racial reason for the exercise of a peremptory
challenge need not be plausible. 73 Following an objection to the
removal of two Black jurors, the prosecutor explained his strike
was based on the long, unkempt hair of one juror and the
mustache and goatee-type beard of the other.7 4  The Court
permitted the strike and held that a prosecutor's explanation is
not required to be clear and reasonably specific when the
reasoning is based on race-neutral characteristics.75 The Court
clarified that Batson's requirement of a 'legitimate reason' is not a
reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal
protection."76
Although the Batson doctrine could be used to protect jurors's
rights under the First Amendment 77 if, for instance, a juror was
removed on the basis of her religion, associations, or expressed
beliefs, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on such a case.78 Two
articulated some basis for the challenge." Id. at 258.
71. Cases involving gender discrimination in jury selection offer the only non-
racial examples in which courts have extended the Batson doctrine. See, e.g.,
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(extending Batson doctrine to prohibit the use of peremptory challenges that
remove jurors on the basis of gender).
72. 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).
73. See id. at 767-68 (using Batson to reverse an Eighth Circuit opinion which
required that the prosecution articulate some plausible race-neutral reason for
believing that a juror's objectionable characteristics will affect that person's ability
to perform his or her duties as a juror).
74. See id. at 766.
75. See id. at 768.
76. Id. at 769. See also Joseph D. Phelps, Batson: Challenges from the
Perspective of a Trial Judge -Some Practical Considerations, 54 ALA. LAW. 320,
322-24 (1993) (listing a number of non-discriminatory explanations for exclusionary
strikes).
77. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ('Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise therof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances").
78. See Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal
Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945 (1998) (arguing that if jury service is
a benefit extended by the government to its citizens, potential jurors should not be
denied the opportunity to serve because of their First Amendment-protected
political beliefs, religious views, marital and childbearing status or group
memberships). See also Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment-
Prohibiting Peremptory Challenges That Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and
[Vol. 18:183
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federal circuit courts, however, have directly addressed the issue
and both declined to extend the Batson doctrine to the First
Amendment context.79 In U.S. v. Villarreal,8 0 the Fifth Circuit
upheld a prosecutor's peremptory challenges of jurors who had
expressed a rigid opposition to capital punishment in a
prosecution in which the United States sought the death penalty.8 1
In Morgan v. City of Albuquerque,8 2 the Tenth Circuit upheld a
peremptory challenge of two potential jurors based upon the
jurors's "association with persons with physical disabilities."83
Similarly, lower courts have been reluctant to rule that Batson can
be used to protect potential jurors from being challenged on the
basis of their religious beliefs.84
II. State v. Buggs
A. Factual Background
Louis Cardona Buggs was tried and convicted by a jury in
Hennepin County District Court for the first-degree murder of his
ex-girlfriend, Kami Talley.8 5 Buggs and Talley's relationship
lasted approximately seven years, and included the birth of their
daughter and the purchase of a home.8 6 They separated in the
spring of 1995.87
When Buggs learned that Talley was dating someone else in
August 1995, he confronted her and assaulted her by repeatedly
punching her in the head.88 Buggs pled guilty to fifth-degree
Association Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567 (1996) (arguing that the conflict
between the litigants's peremptory challenge privilege and the jurors's First
Amendment privileges should be resolved in favor of the jurors's constitutionally
protected First Amendment rights); Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Religion Based
Peremptory Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal
Protection and First Amendment Analysis, 94 MICH. L. REV. 191 (1995) (arguing
that religious-based peremptory challenges are unconstitutional).
79. See Morgan v. City of Albuquerque, 25 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 1994); U.S. v.
Villarreal, 963 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1992).
80. 963 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1992).
81. See id. at 728-29.
82. 25 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 1994).
83. Id. at 920.
84. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993) (holding that Batson
did not apply to religious-based peremptory strikes); U.S. v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d
1153 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a peremptory challenge can be used as a result of
a juror's religious belief). But see, e.g., Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468 (Tex.
1994) (en banc) (holding that discriminatory religious classification infringed on
juror's fundamental right).






assault, served 120 days in jail and received probation for two
years. 89 As part of his probation, he was to have no contact with
Talley or their daughter. 90 After completing his jail sentence,
Buggs made a threatening phone call to Talley.9 1 Immediately
following this violation of the no-contact order, an arrest and
detention order was issued for Buggs.92
On February 12, 1996, Buggs' probation officer called Buggs
to inform him of the arrest and detention warrant and to urge him
to turn himself in to the police. 93 Buggs, however, was already
aware of the warrant, because Talley had called him and warned
him to "watch his back."94 On February 14, 1996, at Talley's place
of employment, her supervisor, William McLellan, heard Talley's
voice and the voice of an unidentified male coming from the
women's restroom. 95 As McLellan was about to open the door, he
heard Talley say "no" three times, the male voice say "you bitch,"
and a single gunshot.96 As McLellan fled the building, he heard
repeated gunfire. 97
After arriving at the scene, police officers found Talley lying
in a pool of blood on the floor.98 When asked who did this to her,
she first replied "Butch" and then replied "Buggs."99 Talley died
approximately two hours later of multiple gunshot wounds to her
chest and abdomen. 100 The day of the murder, Buggs and two
friends left Minnesota and stayed with friends and relatives in
Texas and Mexico.1 1 Police eventually arrested him in Virginia
on April 20, 1996.102
Buggs was charged with first-degree murder and tried by a
Hennepin County District Court jury.103 During questioning of
prospective jurors before trial, the prosecutor exercised a











99. See id. Butch is Buggs's nickname. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 333-34.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 339 (noting that Juror number 32, the excluded White juror, has a
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prior to the peremptory challenge, the prosecutor asked this White
juror a number of exclusively race-related questions.'0 5 The
black daughter and is often mistaken for a Native American).
105. See id. at 343 n.2. The Supreme Court reproduced the entire sequence of
questions in its opinion:
Q. I want to go back to something you talked about with Mr. Lucas and
kind of your impressions when you came in at that first kind of gathering
that we had when we first called all the jurors together. You know, you
indicated some concern about the system, given that you looked around
and there were only a few people of color in the room, and I think you said
something like the 1950's Minnesota or something. Do you have any
perception or information in terms of kind of how that happens or who
controls that or where that comes from, that kind of makeup of a group?
A. Well, looking at the division - I found out that the zip code I gave you
was incorrect. I didn't realize. I had just recently moved and I had the
wrong zip code, so I was looking in the phone book and thas when I
realized this is a county court, so its not just the City of Minneapolis. It's
all of these, and some of the prospective jurors are from the outlying
suburbs, and so it is reflective of the county, I am sure. It just isn't
reflective of the city.
Q. And did that information kind of change maybe how you felt when you
saw that or not?
A. That day, yes.
Q. Do you have some concerns about the system in general treating people
of color fairly?
A. Yes, I have concerns about it.
Q. Can you verbalize that at all, explain that to me what you are
thinking?
A. It all kind of falls back on the media. If I watch the news, if there is a
crime committed, and this is my opinion now. I will just be honest about
it, if the person that they have as a suspect is black, their picture is
flashed on the entire screen. If the person is caucasian, rarely do you see a
picture, and so my family and friends that live in the outlying parts of the
state, I get this sense of fear from them, and I think that it ahs [sic] been
promoted by the media.
Q. And how do you see that played out in the courtroom here in Hennepin
County in terms of what happens in these cases?
A. I don't have any experience with it, I am sorry, but I-that was my
feeling is that, you know, if that assembly room of jurors reflected what I
have known in my acquaintances or just people when I was looking to rent
a place.
Q. Were different?
A. It's different. Because I am caucasian, I hear things from caucasian
people that they wouldn't talk about around black people.
Q. And given that you are being talked to in a case where you can expect
to be a juror and the defendant is African-American, how do you [sic]
beliefs about what we are facing as a society here, how do those beliefs
affect how you would sit as a juror in a case like this where we do have a
defendant of color?
A. I feel-well, the reason I wanted to be a juror so there would be
somebody who doesn't have that fear base.
Q. And would you treat this defendant in this case differently based on the
fact that he is a person of color and not a white person?
A. No. I didn't know when I saw that assembly room that it was going to
be a person of color. I didn't know anything about the case, so I-
Q. And is it kind of your belief or your expectation of your decision making
that the defendant's race should not enter into your decision about the
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defense objected that the peremptory challenge was racially
motivated and deprived Buggs and juror number 32 of their right
to equal protection under the law. 106 The trial court agreed that
the defense had a persuasive objection to the peremptory
challenge. 0 7 Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that it was a
permissible peremptory challenge. 10 8 Because no prima facie case
of discrimination was established, 0 9 the prosecutor was not
required to offer any explanation, race-neutral or otherwise, for
the peremptory challenge. 10
At trial, the State presented strong circumstantial evidence
linking Buggs to the shooting."' This evidence included a red bag
found at the scene of the murder containing Buggs's thumbprint,
and evidence that Buggs owned a gun of the same type likely used
in the murder.112 After two days of deliberation, the jury found
Buggs guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to a
mandatory term of life imprisonment.113 Buggs appealed his
conviction to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which rejected all five
grounds of his appeal. 114
B. Majority Opinion
In addressing Buggs's argument concerning the removal of a
facts of the case?
A. No. I don't feel that I would be affected by race.
Q. And do you feel that its likely or possible that you would hold the state




106. See id. at 339.
107. See id. at 346 n.15. The trial court responded to the defense objection:
I couldn't agree with you more, her answers made her seem like an
ideal juror to try to get this to be as representative as possible of a
jury from the pool we have to choose from. It's unfortunate,
because she does add or would add more, if not minority
representation on the panel, at least someone who lives and works
and understands the black community, and I got that impression
from her.
Id.
108. See id. at 344 n.3. The trial court was "not willing to expand [Batson
protection] to a Caucasian who may be living in a primarily minority family." Id.
109. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (outlining Batson's requirements
for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination).
110. See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d. at 346 n.13.
111. See id. at 334.
112. See id.
113. See id.




potential juror, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the use of
the peremptory challenge did not violate the equal protection
rights of Buggs or juror number 32.115 The court relied in part
upon State v. Stewart,116 which stated that "[a] prima facie case of
racial discrimination is established by showing that one or more
members of a racial group have been peremptorily excluded from
the jury and that circumstances of the case raise an inference that
the exclusion was based on race."" 7 The court emphasized that
the juror was not herself a member of a racial minority, despite
the racial composition of her family." 8 Stating that "Batson
protects the potential juror's racial status," the court refused to
extend Batson to protect a potential juror's "racial and political
beliefs or philosophies.""19
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Page disagreed with the majority's determination
that the peremptory challenge did not constitute a prima facie
case of racial discrimination. 120 Page criticized the majority for
suggesting that because the juror was not a member of a racial
minority, race was not an issue in the case.' 2 ' Page argued that if
juror number 32 had been Black and made the same comments, 122
State v. McRae would have required reversal. 12 3 He asserted that
the majority treated juror number 32 differently simply because
she was White. 24 Page noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court's
Task Force on Racial Bias made an express commitment to root
out racial bias from the judicial system.125 He argued that Batson
115. See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 339.
116. 514 N.W.2d 559 (Minn. 1994).
117. Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
118. See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 339.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 344. Justice Page's dissent was not joined by any other member
of the court. See id.
121. See id. at 345.
122. See id. at 346.
123. See State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 253-58 (Minn. 1992). See also supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing McRae).
124. See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 346.
125. See id. at 345. Page points to the court's commitment to eliminate racial
discrimination as stated in the MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, TASK FORCE ON
RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 32-38 (May 1993). See Buggs,
581 N.W.2d at 345 n.6 (explaining that in 1990, the Minnesota legislature and
Supreme Court created a task force on racial bias in the state's judicial system in
order to explore, document and make recommendations regarding racial bias in
Minnesota courts). Additionally, Justice Page argued that the U.S. and Minnesota
Constitutions obligate the court to eradicate racial bias. See id. at 345.
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sets a floor, rather than a ceiling, for contesting race-based
peremptory challenges, and recommended that the court set a
higher standard to ensure that racial bias does not infect the
selection of jurors. 126
III. Analysis
A. The Peremptory Challenge in Buggs Concerns Both Race
and Discrimination
In an attempt to ensure the continued use and integrity of
the peremptory challenge, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused
to recognize the exclusion of the juror in Buggs as an issue
concerning race or discrimination. 12 7 Regardless of the court's
intent, however, the decision disadvantaged both the potential
juror and the criminal defendant because of their skin color.
1. Racial Discrimination Against the Juror
The juror's removal in Buggs resulted from her responses to
questions dealing exclusively with race.128 Looking at the entire
set of questions posed during voir dire, the only characteristics
revealed about the juror were her concern about the lack of
minority representation on the jury panel, and racism in society
and the media. 129 Considering that the peremptory challenge
immediately followed the voir dire, the prosecution would
presumably have had a difficult time giving a truly race-neutral
explanation for the exclusion.130
Had juror number 32 been Black, State v. McRae would have
required the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation for her
126. See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 347.
127. See id. at 339 (arguing that "[w]hile juror number 32 may have appeared to
be an ideal juror from the defense perspective, the state could well have perceived
her as someone with an agenda who was predisposed to acquit-as the trial court
noted in its ruling, '[t]hat's what perempts are for").
128. See id. at 343 n.2.
129. See supra note 99 (setting out a portion of the trial transcript). Cf. State v.
McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1992) (noting that "a large percentage of fair-
minded, reasonable black people and fair-minded, reasonable people of any other
race would have answered" questions about race and the criminal justice system in
the same way).
130. Conceivably, the juror might have had characteristics not readily apparent
in the voir dire transcript that convinced the prosecutor to exclude her. For
instance, something about her physical demeanor, her tone in answering the
questions or another characteristic may have made her an undesirable juror.
Nevertheless, in light of the apparent racial motivation, the prosecutor should, at a
minimum, be required to reveal any such race-neutral explanation.
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exclusion.131 Read together, Buggs and McRae suggest that a
Black juror cannot be excluded solely because she believes that
Blacks are treated unfairly by the system, but a White juror can.
It follows that the prosecutor in Buggs could exclude juror number
32 not only because of her racial beliefs but also because she was
not Black. Meanwhile, both federal and state courts have
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to protect potential
jurors, 3 2  including Whites, 133  from racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges. Therefore, use of the peremptory
challenge in Buggs should have been sufficient to establish a
prima facie violation of the excluded juror's equal protection
rights.13 4
2. Racial Discrimination Against the Defendant
More significant than the discriminatory impact on juror
number 32 was the discriminatory impact on Buggs himself.
Although Buggs had no constitutional right to a jury made up of a
particular racial composition, 3 5 criminal defendants have a
constitutional right to a jury of peers selected pursuant to
nondiscriminatory criteria. 3 6  As recognized in Batson, an
"indifferently chosen" jury is essential to ensure that a criminal
defendant is not deprived of his life or liberty on account of racial
prejudice. 137
Buggs missed the point when it construed Batson and McRae
to only protect a defendant's interest in a jury containing jurors
with a particular skin color. Although the facts in Batson and
McRae involved Black defendants and Black jurors, the decisions
131. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing State v. McRae,
494 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1992)).
132. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (describing Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400 (1991)).
133. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing extension of
Batson protection to White venire members struck on the basis of their race).
134. Buggs would have third party standing to assert a claim of invidious racial
discrimination on behalf of the excluded juror. See supra note 65 and
accompanying text (describing the Equal Protection Clause and third party
standing in Powers).
135. See supra notes 28 and 47 and accompanying text (discussing the "jury of
peers" limitation).
136. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (arguing that a racially
motivated peremptory challenge denies a criminal defendant equal protection).
137. See id. at 86-87. See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1880) (stating that "[t]he very idea of a jury is a body ... composed of the peers or
equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is,
of his neighbors, fellows, associates, [and] persons having the same legal status in
society as that which he holds").
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turned on the premise that a criminal defendant should not be
disadvantaged on account of the prosecutor's unfounded or
stereotypical assumptions about race. 138 Buggs was disadvantaged
by such an assumption.
Because juror number 32 answered the prosecutor's
questions in a way that reflected her concerns about the plight of
minorities in the criminal justice system and society as a whole, 139
the court permitted the prosecutor to assume this would make her
partial and predisposed to acquit. 140 As the court noted under
similar circumstances in State v. McRae, however, "fair-minded,
reasonable people of any other race" would likely express these
concerns if prompted by a prosecutor's questions. 141 Moreover, the
court has acknowledged that such concerns about racial inequality
in the criminal justice system are factually justified. 142
Nevertheless, the Buggs majority allowed the prosecutor to use
the juror's fair-minded, reasonable opinions as a basis to remove
her from the venire. In the process, the court denied the
defendant a potentially insightful juror from his group of peers.
If one were to imagine a parallel scenario involving a
seventeen-year old criminal defendant, it would be unreasonable
to immediately remove a potential juror who expressed legitimate
concerns about the educational system or the difficulty teenagers
face in the modern world. Logically, if this parallel scenario
peremptory challenge is allowed, it would permit the same
unfounded assumption as in Buggs, that a particular juror,
because she has a common, critical, and socially-responsible belief
system, will not be able to intelligently and impartially analyze
the particular facts of the case at hand. The only difference
between the two scenarios is that in the racial context the United
States Supreme Court and past cases of the Minnesota Supreme
Court have uniformly ruled that such assumptions formed on the
138. See supra notes 33-47 and 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing Batson
and MeRae).
139. See supra note 99 (quoting prosecutor's questioning of the excluded juror).
140. See State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 339 (Minn. 1998) (holding that the
prosecutor's perception of the potential juror justified the peremptory challenge).
141. State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1992). See supra notes 67-70
and accompanying text (describing the facts and holding of McRae).
142. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota Task
Force on Racial Bias). One example of the findings in the FINAL REPORT is that
despite the fact that people of color make up 11% of Hennepin County's population,
they make up just 6% of the county's petit jurors. See MINNESOTA SUPREME




basis of race will not be tolerated. 143
Moreover, it is significant that juror number 32 made her
initial comments regarding the racial make-up of the jury before
she knew the defendant's race. 144 Had Buggs been a White
criminal defendant, juror number 32's comments that the jury pool
reflected the racial composition of 1950s Minnesota would
presumably have gone unnoticed and her observation would have
been insignificant. But because Buggs was Black, the prosecutor
focused exclusively on the juror's views on race and was permitted
to remove her based on those views. Ironically, in the end Buggs
bore the loss of exactly the type of racial disparity that juror
number 32 was perceptive enough to notice. 145 By commenting on
the disproportionate jury panel, juror number 32 set in motion a
process that eventually deprived Buggs of a racially-perceptive
and insightful juror. Had Buggs been White, this process would
never even have been set in motion.
B. The Dangers of Defining Race Narrowly
In Buggs, the court analyzed the issue of race in a way that is
likely to limit future decisions and discussions dealing not only
with peremptory challenges but with any racial issues. First, the
court emphasized that juror number 32, a White woman, was not
a member of a racial minority, regardless of the composition of her
family. 146 Although this comment may have been simply intended
to distinguish Buggs from the typical peremptory challenge case, it
can also be read as a suggestion that racial discrimination in jury
selection is less of a concern for non-minorities. Second, the court
differentiated between a person's racial status and her racial
beliefs, holding that the former is protected by Batson, while the
latter is not. 47 Buggs's narrow definition of what constitutes an
issue of "race" may seem straightforward and fair at first glance,
but it actually presents a number of significant public policy
concerns.
143. See supra Parts I.B and I.C.1 (discussing Batson and extensions of equal
protection to peremptory challenges).
144. See supra note 105 (quoting prosecutor's questioning of the excluded juror).
145. See supra note 142 (indicating that racial composition of juries in
Minnesota does not accurately reflect the racial composition of Minnesota's
population).




1. The Three Goals of Batson Are Now Easily Undermined
By holding that the peremptory challenge in Buggs does not
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the court
opened the door for attorneys to exercise peremptory challenges in
a way that undermines all three objectives of Batson v.
Kentucky.' 48  Buggs's potential for violating the first two
objectives, ensuring that both defendants and jurors are not
discriminated against because of their race, is discussed in the
previous section. 49 The third goal of Batson, maintaining public
confidence in the fairness of the justice system, is also impaired by
Buggs. Just as "empanelling an all-white jury in a heavily black
area still raises eyebrows, no matter how fair the selection process
was in fact,"150 the elimination of a competent and racially-
sensitive juror in the trial of a Black defendant appears suspect,
regardless of the long legal tradition of unquestioned peremptory
strikes. Although the community's confidence in the system is
impossible to measure with any accuracy, the public, as a whole, is
not naive and is capable of recognizing racially discriminatory
intent, even when the narrow categories of the law do not.
When a court chooses to ignore even one of these three
purposes for prohibiting race-based peremptory challenges, the
decision should be carefully scrutinized. Accordingly, where all
three goals are undermined, as in Buggs, public policy requires an
inquiry into whether the value of maintaining the peremptory
challenge status quo justifies the costs to the excluded juror, the
criminal defendant and the community at large. To effectively
reconcile this disparity between the system's goals and its results,
a broadening of courts's conceptions of race is essential. First,
racial discrimination must not be characterized as exclusively a
concern of racial minorities. Instead, the court, the jurors and the
parties should all be presumed to be interested in the elimination
of racial prejudice in the judicial system. Second, courts should
consider racial beliefs and opinions in the determination of
whether racial discrimination has facially occurred. These
adjustments would not eliminate the usefulness of the peremptory
148. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (analyzing the three primary
objectives of Batson).
149. See supra Part III.A.1-2 (discussing the violation of the equal protection
rights of prospective jurors and criminal defendants).
150. Leipold, supra note 78, at 991 (arguing that peremptory strikes based on
race inflict more damage on the public's confidence in the system than would
strikes based on first amendment-protected activities).
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challenge, 151 yet they would eliminate the inconsistencies in a case
like Buggs which attempts to faithfully apply Batson but
ultimately undermines everything Batson sought to accomplish.
2. Racial Categorization Is Becoming Increasingly Complex
Another danger of building a body of law on the narrow
definition of "race" used in Buggs is that the racial status of
individuals is difficult to accurately pinpoint. 152 The current
categories of racial classification were created by the federal
government for statistical and administrative purposes, yet have
been widely criticized as being an inaccurate reflection of people's
actual racial and ethnic identities. 153  These government
categories often fail to conform to biological reality, 54 especially in
the case of mixed-race individuals. 155
In light of the flaws in these socially-constructed racial
categories, a rigid system of extending Batson protection to
individuals only according to their racial status seems both unwise
and unjust. With continuing population changes due to
immigration and interracial marriage,156  the practice of
identifying racial categories in America will inevitably become
more difficult. Furthermore, in the interests of justice, courts
should not encourage the practice of imposing government-created
racial categories on individuals who perceive their own racial
identities differently. Finally, rigid racial categorizations by
courts may foster a greater sense of separation between racial
groups, which in turn will result in more racial prejudice in the
151. See infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text (responding to the potential
criticism that extending Batson to racial beliefs will eliminate the usefulness of the
peremptory challenge).
152. See Omi, supra note 44, at 23 (arguing that "[r]ace and ethnicity will
continue to defy our best efforts to establish coherent definitions over time. The
real world is messy with no clear answers. Nothing demonstrates this convolution
better than the social construction of racial and ethnic categories.").
153. See id. at 9-13 (discussing how a person's membership of a racial group is
determined for the purpose of legal classification). But see Denton, supra note 44
(arguing that despite flaws in reflecting individuals's personal identity, assigning a
social identity is essential).
154. See HOLLINGER, supra note 44, at 29-31 (explaining that the current
categories fail to correspond even to the archaic "racial" definitions of Caucasian,
Negroid and Mongoloid).
155. See ZACK, supra note 44, at 142-43 (describing the alienation felt by mixed-
race Americans who find that the government categories do not describe them); see
also HOLLINGER, supra note 44, at 43 (arguing that mixed-raced persons will
ultimately deal the current categories their death blow).
156. See Denton, supra note 44, at 84 (discussing how a person's membership in




3. Buggs Definition of Race Sets a New Precedent
Prior to Buggs, no court had squarely addressed the issue of
whether removing a juror on the basis of her racial beliefs
constitutes purposeful discrimination. Consequently, in ruling as
it did, the Minnesota Supreme Court missed an opportunity to
clarify the law in a way that discourages rather than encourages
racially motivated peremptory challenges. In light of the court's
obligation to eliminate racial bias from the state's courts,15 7
Buggs's appeal would have been an ideal opportunity for the court
to demonstrate its commitment to thoughtfully confronting
racism. Instead, the court defined race quite narrowly and chose
to confine Batson's equal protection analysis to only the most
clear-cut and simplistic fact scenarios.
C. Potential Criticisms of Extending Batson Protection to
Racial Beliefs
The proposal to extend Batson equal protection analysis to
the racial beliefs or opinions of jurors raises a number of potential
criticisms. Given the historically unlimited use of peremptory
challenges in U.S. courts, any proposal to increase restrictions in
this area of the law will probably be met with resistance. 15 This
section addresses three likely criticisms of the proposal to extend
Batson protection to racial beliefs.
1. The Usefulness of Peremptory Challenges Will Not be
Undermined
The primary criticism of prohibiting peremptory challenges
on the basis of a juror's racial beliefs is that this would effectively
eliminate the usefulness of peremptory challenges altogether.15 9
This premise is flawed because it mistakenly assumes that
extending Batson protection to racial beliefs and opinions
automatically requires extending Batson protection to all beliefs
157. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT, TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, FINAL
REPORT and the court's obligations under state and federal constitutions).
158. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the history of the peremptory challenge and
the slow, evolving process aimed at eliminating race-based peremptory challenges).
159. See State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 339 (1998) (refusing to extend Batson's
equal protection analysis to a juror's beliefs or philosophies, because the purpose of
the peremptory challenge is to allow parties to remove any juror whose beliefs
suggest a predisposition to decide in favor of the other side).
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and opinions. 16 0 For many people, their beliefs on race likely
reflect a very small portion of their total personality or belief
system. There are numerous aspects of the human condition that
could legitimately justify the exclusion of a juror. Whether it be on
the basis of the juror's political, religious or social beliefs, parties
could continue to use peremptory challenges to remove potentially
unfavorable jurors.
Race, however, is treated differently. In light of the extensive
history of racial discrimination in this country and the difficulty of
detecting racial discrimination, Batson and its progeny recognized
that preventing racially discriminatory peremptory challenges
required special treatment and heightened scrutiny. 16 1 Although a
party's primary goal in using a peremptory challenge may be to
increase their chances of winning the case, racial discrimination
should not be accepted as a necessary by-product of a jury trial.
2. Racially Insensitive or Intolerant Jurors Will Not be
Protected
It could also be argued that the extension of Batson
protection to the racial beliefs of a racially sensitive and tolerant
juror would require similar protection for the racial beliefs of a
racially insensitive or intolerant juror. For instance, supporters of
this argument may assert that a white supremacist could not be
removed from the trial of a Black defendant on the basis of that
juror's racial beliefs. Such a scenario, however, differs from a
situation like Buggs in three significant respects. First, keeping a
White supremacist on the jury would violate Batson's objective of
eliminating racial discrimination against the criminal defendant.
In such a scenario, a Black defendant's equal protection rights
would be violated because having a White supremacist on the jury
would disadvantage the defendant solely on the basis of the
defendant's skin color. Second, Batson's objective of ensuring that
juror's are not discriminated against on account of their race
would also be upheld because the exclusion of the overtly racist
juror would not depend at all on the juror's skin color, but only on
her inability to impartially consider evidence. For example, if a
160. See id. The court's argument makes no distinction between racial beliefs
and opinions and all types of beliefs and opinions. See id.
161. See supra notes 35-70 and accompanying text (discussing Batson and
extensions of Batson protection). Significantly, the only similar extension of such
special treatment outside the racial context involved gender discrimination, which
is comparable to racial discrimination in its deeply-rooted history, its subtlety and
its attack on the unmalleable essence of an individual. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994).
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Black juror demonstrated an intolerance of other Blacks in the
trial of a Black defendant, that juror could be removed with a
peremptory challenge, yet that removal would have nothing to do
with the race of the juror in question. Third, Batson's goal of
encouraging public confidence in the justice system would clearly
be furthered by the exclusion of racially intolerant jurors.
Ultimately, when a peremptory challenge is made on the basis of a
juror's racial beliefs, the court must analyze all these factors to
determine whether purposeful racial discrimination has truly
taken place.
3. Trial Judges Will Not Have Excessive Discretion
Another potential criticism of extending Batson protection to
a juror's racial beliefs is that such a rule would give too much
discretion to the trial judge. This fear of unpredictable or
inconsistent application of Batson's principles is not justified.
Inevitably, a trial judge will need to look subjectively at each
peremptory challenge to determine whether the excluded juror has
been discriminated against on the basis of their racial status or
their racial beliefs. This is necessarily a fluid test, which will vary
depending upon the circumstances of each particular jury selection
process. Nevertheless, extending Batson protection to racial
beliefs will not create any more judicial discretion than is
currently exercised in every trial. The trial judge is the only
person in a position to neutrally analyze the jury selection process.
Regardless of whether an accusation of discrimination is based
upon the juror's skin-color or upon the juror's racial beliefs, the
ultimate determination will rest with the trial judge to decide if
the explanation of the peremptory strike is truly race-neutral.
A criticism that such a rule provides for too much judicial
discretion would essentially be an argument in favor of returning
to a pre-Batson analysis of race and jury selection. 62 By analyzing
the relevant circumstances of each individual case, the trial judge
plays an indispensable role in eliminating racial prejudice in the
use of peremptory challenges.
Conclusion
Buggs takes a step in the wrong direction in the judicial
162. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text (establishing that prior to
Batson a defendant needed to prove a prosecutor's pattern of racial discrimination
over a series of cases, while Batson permitted a trial judge to look exclusively at the
relevant circumstances of the immediate case to determine that an equal protection
violation had occurred).
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system's effort to eliminate racial bias from the courts. The
complexity of racial discrimination requires that courts be willing
to look beyond skin color to determine whether purposeful racial
discrimination is occurring. It must be remembered that despite
its lengthy tradition in the U.S. legal system, the peremptory
challenge is not a constitutional necessity. By taking into
consideration a juror's racial beliefs or opinions, courts will be able
to more accurately and more justly determine whether invidious
racial prejudices are being acted upon in the courtroom. The final
result will be to secure the equal protection rights of the parties
and the potential jurors while fostering the community's faith in
the fairness of the criminal justice system.

